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RECONCEIVING INTERPRETIVE
AUTONOMY: INSIGHTS FROM THE
VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY
RESOLUTIONS*
Wayne D. Moore**
Judges are not the only constitutional decisionmakers in the
United States. It is necessary, therefore, to move beyond widespread preoccupation with the Constitution's judicial interpretation and enforcement. Judicial review is certainly an important
practice in America, one closely identified with commitment to
the rule of law. But excessive attention to issues surrounding judicial articulation of constitutional norms has obscured and distorted analysis of other, equally fundamental components of
American constitutionalism. A variety of political actors in addition to judges have had pivotal roles in creating, sustaining and
enforcing the supreme law.
Judges have, at times, been central players in conflicts over
the character and scope of federal and state powers. From the
late 1800s through 1937, for example, judges repeatedly invalidated exercises of national power in reliance on the Tenth
Amendment's reservation of powers to the states.l Since the
"constitutional revolution" surrounding the New Deal, however,
judges and scholars have not typically regarded the Tenth
Amendment as a formidable obstacle.2 Certainly there are good
reasons for thinking about whether recent cases, such as New
* Copyright © 1994 by Wayne D. Moore. All rights reserved. I am indebted to
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Mark E. Brandon for comments and questions on drafts of
this essay and to Walter F. Murphy, William F. Harris, II, and an anonymous reviewer for
Princeton University Press for comments and questions on parts of a book manuscript
from which this article derives. I am also grateful for opportunities to discuss issues
raised by this piece with Karen M. Hult and Stephen K. White. I dedicate this article to
the memory of my father, Maynard L. Moore, Jr.
** J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1983; Ph.D., Politics, Princeton University, 1992; Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University.
1. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhan, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
2. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. (Claremont Colleges Press, 1941), for a description of the central components of this "constitutional
revolution."
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York v. United States,3 might foreshadow renewed judicial concern with limits on national authority;4 but it would be wrong to
assume that principles of federalism, including important forms
of state autonomy, depend primarily on how judges exercise their
powers.
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799
provide contexts for examining problems of constitutional meaning and authority that are typically obscured by forms of analysis
that center on the Constitution's judicial enforcement. The legislatures of two states passed resolutions that condemned the federal government's making and enforcing the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798. These two states' actions raised serious questions
about the character and reach of the United States Constitution
and powers delegated by it, the location of sovereignty within
America, arrangements of interpretive authority among institutions of federal and state government, and relationships among
powers of governmental officials and rights and powers of the
people at large.
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, along with drafts
and responses to them, are especially valuable because they
demonstrate how problems of interpretive authority cut across
other forms of normative disagreement. Controversy over the
Alien and Sedition Acts posed two main sets of constitutional
issues: whether the Alien and Sedition Acts were valid, and
whether efforts by two states to oppose them were valid. Much
may be gained from paying attention not only to how various
persons were interpreting the Constitution and what positions
they took on these two issues, but also to whose positions were
constitutionally authoritative. Accordingly, the focus of this essay is relationships among federal and state interpretive
prerogatives.
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were radical when
written: They dealt with foundational issues of American constitutionalism and called into question opposing conceptions of
constitutional meaning and authority. Over the past two centuries, these documents have become even more radical (or have
3. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). See also H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
Constitutional Law, 19 Va. L. Rev. 633, 689 (1993) (suggested, in the context of commenting on New York v. United States, that principles and structures of federalism have "no
legal substance" if not enforced by judges).
4. A majority of the Supreme Court repudiated earlier efforts to revive principles
of federalism, which culminated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), by reversing that precedent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 u.s. 528 (1985).
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become radical in a new way): They identify interpretive options
that have become increasingly obscured by current ways of thinking. It is useful to consider seriously whether these radical perspectives warrant contemporary ratification as part of America's
fundamental law.
I. THREE FORMS OF PROTEST
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 resulted from, and exacerbated, divisions between the Federalist and Republican parties that formed during the Republic's early years.s John Adams,
a leading Federalist, defeated Thomas Jefferson, a leading Republican, in the presidential election of 1796. Jefferson became
Vice President pursuant to electoral rules that were in effect at
the time.
In anticipation of a possible war with France, the predominantly Federalist Congress enacted four laws in 1798, known
popularly as the Alien and Sedition Acts. Two of these were especially controversial: the Alien Friends Law ("An Act concerning Aliens"), which allowed the President to order deportation of
aliens; and the Sedition Law, which made seditious libel a criminal offense. The latter was directed primarily toward Republican
critics of the Federalist administration. (Federalists sought to
characterize the Republicans as sympathetic with the French and
with movements underlying the 1789 French Revolution.) Federal judges, who were also predominantly Federalist, were more
than willing to enforce the acts, particularly against Republicans
and their alien allies. 6
5. See Kenneth R. Bowling, Politics in the First Congress, 1789-1791 (Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990), for an examination of the historical origins of the Federalist and Republican parties, including their relationships to divisions between the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists of the 1780's.
6. Except where otherwise specified, the remainder of this essay refers to the Alien
Friends Act and the Sedition Law as "the Alien and Sedition Acts." James Morton
Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Cornell U. Press, 1956), reprints these acts and gives an account of the historical circumstances surrounding their adoption and enforcement, along with similar information on
the Naturalization Act and the Alien Enemies Law of 1798. For other historical analyses
of the Alien and Sedition Acts and their enforcement, see also Walter Berns, Freedom of
the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. 109 (1970);
Adrienne Koch and Harry Ammon, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode
in Jefferson's and Madison's Defense of Civil Liberties, 5 Wm. & Mary Q. (3rd. ser.) 145
(1948); John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition AcL!' (Little, Brown &
Co., 1951); Nathan Schachner, 2 Thomas Jefferson: A Biography ch. 43 (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951); Stephen B. Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The English,
the Americans and the Dialectic of Federalist Jurisprudence chs. 7 & 8 (Carolina Academic
Press, 1991); Ethelbert D. Warfield, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798: An Historical
Study (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1894).
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Jefferson was in a peculiar predicament. He opposed the
laws and their enforcement, but he was not in a good position to
challenge federal authority openly. The Vice President thus
turned to one of the "external" checks contemplated by the authors of The Federalist Papers: state legislatures.? He secretly
drafted a set of resolutions for adoption by the North Carolina
legislature, which he sought to use as a vehicle for voicing opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts.
Jefferson's messenger, Wilson Cary Nicholas, apparently
gave the draft to John Breckinridge of Kentucky for consideration by that state's legislature instead of North Carolina's. The
Kentucky legislature approved some but not all of the resolutions
in Jefferson's draft. (The draft, though written for adoption by
North Carolina's legislature, is now generally identified as Jefferson's draft of the Kentucky Resolutions.) As approved, the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 took a more modest position than
Jefferson's draft on the state legislature's powers of protest.
The same year, 1798, Virginia's legislature approved resolutions that had been drafted by Madison, who had joined Jefferson in opposing the Federalists (with many of whom, ironically,
Madison had been allied in debates over the Constitution's ratification). In addition, the following year, 1799, the Kentucky legislature endorsed a variation of the stronger claims of state
authority that had been in Jefferson's draft but deleted from the
resolutions approved by that state's legislature in 1798. These
various drafts, along with responses to them and subsequent
analyses, identify at least three forms of state protest against federal governmental actions: nullification, reversal, and interposition. I deal with each in turn.s
7. See notes 22, 50-52 & 56-57, infra, and the accompanying text. John C. Calhoun
adopted a similar strategy to oppose tariffs when he was Vice President under Andrew
Jackson. See William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in
South Carolina, 1816-1836 154-73 (Harper & Row, 1966).
8. Jefferson wrote two drafts of the resolutions, both of which are reprinted in Paul
L. Ford, ed., 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 289-309 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 10 vols., 189299), along with a facsimile of the resolutions approved by the Kentucky legislature in
1798. The "fair" copy to which this essay refers is also reprinted in Merrill D. Peterson,
ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson 281-89 (Viking Press, 1975). The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, as approved, are reprinted in Jonathan Elliot, ed., 4 Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended
by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787 at 540-45 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 2nd
ed., 1888) ("Debates"), except that Elliot omitted the phrase, "its co-states forming, as to
itself, the other party," from paragraph 1 of his reprint of the Resolutions of 1798. The
Virginia Resolutions, which were almost identical to a draft prepared by Madison, are
reprinted in 17 Papers of James Madison 188-90 (U. Chi. Press, vols. 1-10, 1962-77; and U.
Press of Va., vols. 11-17, 1977-92); and in Gaillard Hunt, ed., 6 Writings of James Madison
326-31 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 9 vols., 1900-10); and 4 Debates at 528-29.
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A
In his draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson claimed
that the states had authority to nullify acts of Congress, at least
for some purposes and in some contexts, whether or not the
Supreme Court concurred that the acts were unconstitutional.
He distinguished "cases of an abuse of the delegated powers"
from cases in which "powers are assumed which have not been
delegated." Apparently referring to federal electoral processes,
he claimed that a "change by the people" was the "constitutional
remedy" for the former abuse. But his resolutions declared that
if the federal government usurped powers other than those delegated to it by the Constitution, "a nullification of the act [was]
the rightful remedy."9
Jefferson's position on interpretive authority, therefore, paralleled his conception of constitutional boundaries. He characterized the Constitution as a "compact" among "the several
States composing the United States of America." He claimed
that the states "constituted a general government for special purposes" and "delegated to that government certain definite powers." Accordingly, he argued that "whensoever the general
government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force."to
Jefferson ran together his analysis of the states' and the people's prerogatives. Part of this imprecision may be attributed to
the fact that his principal objective was to articulate bounds of
federal power rather than to distinguish the people's rights from
state powers. He placed the people and the states on the same
side of the boundary that most concerned him. In addition, he
assumed that institutions of state government were accountable
to the states' citizens, had primary responsibility to secure rights
over which the federal government had no power, and were authorized to voice the people's collective determinations.n
9. Jefferson's draft of the Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 1798), reprinted in 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 301 (cited in note 8).
10. ld. at 289-91.
11. For example, Jefferson argued in reliance on the Tenth Amendment that because "no power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press
[was] delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, all lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the
States or the people." Similarly, he cited the First Amendment and claimed that because
"libels, falsehood, and defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld
from the cognizance of federal tribunals," the states and the people "retain to themselves
the right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged
without lessening their useful freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be separated from their use should be tolerated, rather than the use be destroyed." He elabo-
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Jefferson argued that unless the states had authority to "nullify" the federal government's assumptions of undelegated
power, the states and their residents "would be under the dominion, absolute and unlimited, of whosoever might exercise this
right of judgment for them." He asserted that Congress could
not have this authority because it was "not a party, but merely
the creature of the compact." Similarly, he characterized federal
courts as part of "the government created by this compact." He
claimed that no part of this government could be "the exclusive
or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since
that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution,
the measure of its powers." On the other hand, he argued that
the states alone were "parties to the compact.'' In the absence of
a "common judge," he submitted, the states were "solely authorized to judge in the last resort of the powers exercised under (the
Constitution]. "1z
Jefferson equivocated on whether each state had authority to
nullify as ultra vires actions by the federal government or
whether the states could only do so collectively. Suggesting the
former but referring to the states plurally, he argued: "(E]very
State has a natural right in cases not within the compact, (casus
non foederis,) to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of
power by others within their limits. "13 The draft provided that it
would "nevertheless" be communicated from one state to its "coStates" out of "regard and respect." Furthermore, the resolutions sought the other states' "concur[rence) in declaring these
rated on his reference to "themselves" in the context of discussing powers over religion.
He referred to the people of the states, acting through their legislatures and/or limiting
them, and declared that "they guarded against all abridgment by the United States of the
freedom of religious opinions and exercises, and retained to themselves the right of protecting the same, as this State, by a law passed on the general demand of its citizens, had
already protected them from all human restraint or interference." ld. at 294-95 (emphasis added). Compare Koch and Ammon, 5 Wm. & Mary Q. (cited in note 6) (underscored
linkages among state prerogatives and those of the people at large).
But see Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, (Oxford U. Press, 1985), for an
argument that the main concern of those opposed to the Alien and Sedition Acts, at least
initially, was to resist encroachment on state prerogatives rather than retained rights.
Walter Berns, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. (cited in note 6), placed even greater emphasis on issues
of federalism. (Although Berns linked Jefferson's position on state independence to his
arguments concerning the nature of the federal compact, these arguments were conceptually distinct. Jefferson's claim of limited federal powers did not depend on an assumption that the federal government had no powers that could preempt separate
determinations by states and the people-i.e., in cases of the federal government's acting
within delegated authority. In addition, issues of state authority and the people's rights
overlapped more than Berns conceded.)
12. 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 291-92, 301-02 (cited in note 8).
13. Id. at 301 (emphasis added). As explained below, this provision was deleted by
the Kentucky legislature in 1798 but then affirmed in 1799.
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acts void, and of no force." Jefferson attached importance to collective action by the states, but anticipated that each state could
legitimately "take measures of its own for providing that neither
these acts, nor any others of the General Government not plainly
and intentionally authorized by the Constitution, shall be exercised within their respective territories."t4
Although Madison later argued that Jefferson had not
claimed that a single state could unilaterally nullify a congressional enactment,t5 his draft of the Kentucky Resolutions leaves
little doubt that he was taking a position that the states collectively had authority to take such an action.16 Furthermore, at a
time when the Union depended heavily on cooperation by state
governments for enforcing federal laws, Jefferson apparently
contemplated disregard by state officials of the Alien and Sedition Acts.17 In sum, he sanctioned independent action by the
states based in part on the state legislature's interpretation of its
reserved prerogatives.
B

As indicated above, the Kentucky legislature adopted two
versions of Jefferson's draft. The initial version, the Kentucky
Resolutions of 1798, made two significant changes to Jefferson's
draft. First, the Resolutions of 1798 did not claim that the states
had authority, either separately or collectively, to nullify congressional enactments. The legislature eventually embraced Jeffer14. ld. at 301, 306.
15. James Madison, Letter to _ _ Townsend, October 18, 1831, reprinted in 4
Letters and Other Writings of James Madison at 198-200 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1865).
16. See Koch and Ammon, 5 Wm. & Mary Q. (cited in note 6); Schachner, Thomas
Jefferson: A Biography (cited in note 6).
17. It is not clear whether Jefferson also approved more direct forms of interference
with the laws' enforcement such as releasing prisoners from jails. (Compare later controversies over extradition or rendition of slaves or other persons charged with breaking
fugitive slave laws.) According to Warfield, there was not a single prosecution in Kentucky under the Alien and Sedition Acts, and "[t]he situation in Virginia, though different, was never serious enough to lead to any thing like organized resistance. Indeed, it is
now impossible to decide just how far and in just what form resistance was contemplated
by these Resolutions." Warfield, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798: An Historical Study
at 110 (cited in note 6). See also Jefferson's letter to Wilson C. Nicholas of August 23,
1799, in which Jefferson affirmed the importance of the principles involved, considered
possible forms of resistance, and indicated that he wished to preserve as many options as
possible-to be able to do "whatever we might now rightfully do." The letter is reprinted
in 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 389-92 (cited in note 8). For analyses of patterns of
federal enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts, see Frank M. Anderson, The Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Laws, Annual Repon of the American Historical Association for 1912 at 115-26 (Washington, D.C., 1914); Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien
and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties cbs. 9-17, esp. ch. 15 (cited in note 6) (on
enforcement of the Sedition Act in Virginia).
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son's position, however, in a second set of resolutions that were
adopted in 1799. I discuss this reversal more thoroughly below.
Second, the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were submitted
to the state's Senators and Representatives in Congress, and
other states were requested to "unite with this commonwealth in
requesting the[ ] repeal at the next session of Congress" of the
"unconstitutional and obnoxious acts." (Jefferson's draft had not
been addressed to Congress. He claimed it was only proper for
the states to communicate with one another, "they alone being
parties to the compact.") Whereas Jefferson had presumed that
the states could nullify unconstitutional laws on their own authority, the Kentucky legislature initially placed greater reliance
on established federal structures such as repeal by Congress or a
declaration of unconstitutionality by the United States Supreme
Court.ts
The Resolutions of 1798 were a type of communication, or
petition. They functioned, among other things, to communicate
the state's purported determination that the Alien and Sedition
Acts were unconstitutional. The Resolutions did not, however,
claim to oblige the state's representatives in Congress to vote for
repeal of the acts.t9 Instead, the state legislature "enjoined" the
state's Senators and Congressmen to "use their best endeavors"
to procure a repeal of the "unconstitutional and obnoxious
acts."zo
The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were nevertheless significant, because they asserted the state's interpretive independence.
The Resolutions did not presuppose that Congress or the
Supreme Court had preclusive interpretive authority on issues of
constitutional meaning. Instead, the Resolutions included a provision from Jefferson's draft that asserted each state's authority
to "judge for itself" both whether the federal government had
exceeded its legitimate powers and how to remedy any such
infraction.
18. Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798), reprinted in 4 Debates at 542-44.
19. Compare debates in the First Congress over whether to add to the First Amendment's precursor a declaration that the people had a right "to instruct their Representatives." See 1 Annals of Congress 733 (Aug. 15, 1789) (Gales and Seaton ed., 1834). This
proposal sparked more controversy, measured by the volume of discussion reported in
the Annals, than any other single provision. The Journal of the Senate for September 3,
1789 (volume 1, at 117) indicates that a similar motion was made and rejected in the
Senate on September 3, 1789, but there are no records of the Senate's debates or other
proceedings on this matter. These proposals had broad importance: whether constituents
had a constitutional right or power, through instructions, to preempt or otherwise constrain choices by governmental officials-including official positions on issues of constitutional interpretation.
20. 4 Debates at 542.
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Under the circumstances, the Kentucky legislators apparently thought the most appropriate remedy was congressional repeal rather than formal state nullification.21 The legislators
sought to influence all of the state's representatives: those selected by the state legislature and those elected by the people
directly. The legislature acted on its own behalf by enjoining the
state's Senators to represent the legislature's considered position
and acted on behalf of the people of the state in taking a similar
position vis-a-vis members of the House of Representatives.
Madison and Hamilton had contemplated both possibilities in
The Federalist: state legislatures acting as representatives on behalf of the states as such and on behalf of their citizens.22
The Kentucky legislature's position was partially vindicated.
Although Congress did not repeal any of the acts, the Alien
Friends Act and the Sedition Act expired according to their
terms in 1800 and 1801, respectively. The immediate crisis with
France passed; and after the Republicans' electoral successes in
1800, the Federalists had no interest in renewing the Sedition
Act. The Naturalization Act and the Alien Enemies Act remained in effect, but they had not been the main objects of Republican opposition.
Before the two objectionable acts expired, however, a majority of the other states criticized the Kentucky Resolutions of
1798 and Madison's "Virginia Resolutions." At issue was the
states' powers of protest, not just the validity of the acts in question. Thus it is important to consider whether the Resolutions of
1798 had any intrinsic effects, independent of subsequent action
or inaction by other states or by federal officials.
The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were unclear on what
formal effect, if any, the state's declaration of unconstitutionality
purported to have. Was it only (though significantly) a public
21. For accounts of changes to Jeffersou 's draft, the introduction of revised resolutions, and their adoption by the Kentucky legislature, see Edward Channing, Kentucky
Resolutions of 1798,20 Am. Hist. Rev. 333 (1915); Koch and Ammon, 5 Wm. & Mary Q.
at 156-58 (cited in note 6); Schachner, 2 Thomas Jefferson: A Biography, at 615-16 (cited
in note 6); and Berns, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 127-28 (cited in note 6). From the sources I
have reviewed, there appears to be no conclusive evidence that Breckinridge made the
changes to Jefferson's draft, although Schachner and Berns reasonably assumed that he
had a major role in making such changes. Moreover, Schachner's work refers to evidence
that Breckinridge thought "the several States" had authority to nullify the Alien and Sedition Acts "[i]f, upon representations of the States from whom they derive their powers,
(Congress] should nevertheless attempt to enforce (the acts]." The idea of exhausting
constitutional means would have been attractive to members of the Kentucky legislature,
whether or not at the behest of Breckinridge.
22. Compare, e.g., Madison's arguments in The Federalist Nos. 44, 45, 46, and 51;
and Hamilton's arguments in The Federalist Nos. 26, 28, 32, 33, and 60.
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utterance, or type of petition, designed to influence Kentucky's
co-states and their federal representatives? Or did it also authorize state officials to ignore the laws or interfere more actively
with their enforcement? Did the declaration authorize the state's
residents to disobey the laws? Did it have any other legal effects,
short of formal nullification? For all practical purposes, did it
even nullify the acts, or suspend their enforceability within the
state, notwithstanding the omission of an explicit claim to do so?
The Kentucky legislature finessed these questions in 1798 by
relying directly on Jefferson's idea that the Alien and Sedition
Acts were "not law" and thus were "altogether void, and of no
force. "23 This position rested on a premise that the Constitution
had meaning independent of any person's or institution's interpretations of it. If the acts of Congress were not enacted in pursuance of the Constitution, they were not valid, measured by the
criteria set forth in the constitutional text itself.
According to this line of reasoning, the Alien and Sedition
Acts were void and unenforceable even if the state legislature did
not formally nullify them or Congress did not repeal them. In
1798, the state officials were apparently unsure of whether they
had authority to nullify the acts, and for practical reasons the
legislators favored repeal. But they did not make their declaration of unconstitutionality dependent on any such future actions.
Furthermore, the legislators evidently thought the state had justification, whether based on the Kentucky Resolutions or otherwise, to oppose enforcement of the laws within the state's
borders.
This position raised but did not resolve important practical
dilemmas. Assuming the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional and thus void and unenforceable even absent their formal nullification, what was the "supreme law of the land" in this
context? How could persons ascertain the requirements of
"supreme law" for purposes of guiding their behavior if the Constitution's meaning transcended any particular person's or institution's interpretations of the law? Did each person have
constitutional authority to act based on his or her analyses of
constitutional meanings and their implications in particular circumstances? Alternatively, did the Constitution give governmental officials some sort of final authority to resolve
interpretive disputes at least pending formal reconsideration of
such decisions or change in the law? What recourse did states
and their residents have if federal officials used institutions of
23.

4 Debates at 540-41.
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collective power to enforce what may have been an unconstitutional law?24
Other states' responses to the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and Madison's defense of the latter resolutions
against the other states' criticisms shed light on these issues.
These materials also provide criteria for evaluating some of the
differences between Jefferson's draft and the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 (or, what amounts to much the same thing, differences between the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799).
Moreover, the Virginia Resolutions and Madison's defense of
them presented intermediate positions on several issues of constitutional resistance, thus providing a third model that is worth
considering along with the stronger and weaker versions of the
Kentucky Resolutions.

c
Madison expressed to Jefferson some important concerns
about whether state legislatures had authority to nullify federal
legislation. Madison wrote to his friend and mentor:
Have you ever considered thoroughly the distinction between
the power of the State, & that of the Legislature, on questions
relating to the federal pact. On the supposition that the former is clearly the ultimate Judge of infractions, it does not follow that the latter is the legitimate organ especially as a
Convention was the organ by which the Compact was made.zs

Madison sought to protect himself against this same criticism in
his draft of resolutions for adoption by the Virginia legislature:
This was a reason of great weight for using general expressions
that would leave to other States a choice of all the modes possible of concurring in the substance, and would shield the
Genl. Assembly (of Virginia] agst. the charge of Usurpation in
the very act of protesting agst. the usurpations of Congress.26

The Virginia Resolutions appealed to "the like disposition of the
other States, in confidence that they will concur with this Com24. Compare Sanford Levinson's discussion of "protestant" and "catholic" conceptions of the Constitution's arrangement of interpretive authority in Sanford Levinson,
Constitutional Faith ch. 1 (Princeton U. Press, 1988).
25. James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, December 29, 1798, reprinted in 17
Papers of James Madison at 191-92 (cited in note 8) (emphasis in original). Madison was
apparently responding to Jefferson's criticism of his draft, which is cited in note 29.
26. ld.
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monwealth in declaring, as it does hereby declare, that the [Alien
and Sedition] acts ... are unconstitutional."27
Madison drafted the Virginia Resolutions for adoption by
the state's legislature rather than a state convention. He presumed, as had Jefferson, that state legislatures could speak on
behalf of the respective states. But in place of Jefferson's claims
of state authority to "nullify" the federal laws, Madison used the
rhetoric of "interposition." The resolutions "interposed" the
state's authority, expressed by its legislature, between the people
of the state, on the one hand, and the federal government, on the
other. In this manner, he apparently sought to ground the legislature's opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts more solidly in
the authority of the people of the state.
Although he left open the possibility that the states might
have had collective nullifying authority, he concentrated on less
extraordinary measures. The Virginia Resolutions had four main
components. First, the legislature "declare[d]" the Alien and Sedition Acts "unconstitutional. "zs Apparently at Jefferson's urging, a draft of the Resolutions also declared the acts "not law, but
utterly null, void and of no force or effect."29 The legislature
struck those words, making the final Resolutions silent on
whether the federal laws continued in effect or were void based
on constitutional standards alone.
Second, the Virginia Resolutions declared that the state
would take "necessary and proper" measures to "maintain[ ]
27. Virginia Resolutions (December 21, 1798), reprinted in id. at 188, 190. The Virginia Resolutions provided that a copy of the document be transmitted to "the Executive
authority of each of the other States, with a request that the same may be communicated
to the Legislature thereof." Id. at 190. Jefferson's draft of the Kentucky Resolutions was
comparable on these issues. It provided for transmission of the resolutions by a conference committee to "the Legislatures of the several States" but also invited the "co-States"
(not their legislatures) to concur in Kentucky's declaration of unconstitutionality. See 7
Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 300, 301-02, 305-06 (cited in note 8).
28. 17 Papers of James Madison at 190 (cited in note 8).
29. See 17 Papers of James Madison at 185-88, 191 n.2 (cited in note 8). According
to this source, the words had not been in Madison's original draft but were added by
Wilson Cary Nicholas, at Jefferson's request, before John Taylor introduced the resolutions into the Virginia General Assembly. This position, suggested by Koch and Ammon,
5 Wm. & Mary Q. at 159-60 (cited in note 6), is based largely on a letter from Jefferson to
Nicholas, dated November 29, 1798, which is reprinted in 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson
at 312-13 (cited in note 8). Jefferson urged that "instead of the invitation to cooperate in
the annulment of the acts," it would be better to make the resolutions "an invitation 'to
concur with this commonwealth in declaring, as it does hereby declare, that the said acts
are, and were ab initio, null, void and of no force, or effect.' " But Gaillard Hunt, 6
Writings of James Madison at 326-27 n.1 (cited in note 8), claimed that the draft, "as
Madison prepared it," declared the acts "unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect."
According to Hunt, "the words in italics [were) struck out as unnecessary repetition." Id.
The available evidence is inconclusive.
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unimpaired the authorities, rights, and liberties, reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." The legislature called for
"universal alarm" and urged that it would be "reproachful inconsistency and criminal degeneracy, if an indifference were now
shown to the most palpable violation[s]" of rights so anxiously
secured by constitutional amendment.3o The resolutions were silent, however, on what measures state officials had authority to
take in protecting those rights. The document again asserted the
state's interpretive independence and implied that those officials
had no obligation to enforce the Alien and Sedition Acts, but did
not address whether any person had authority to interfere with
federal enforcement.
Third, the legislature appealed to other states to join Virginia in declaring the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional
and in protecting reserved prerogatives of the states and the people. The legislature pledged its "mutual friendship" in maintaining "a scrupulous fidelity to [the] Constitution" and appealed to
"the like dispositions of the other States."31 Among other things,
these passages reflect Madison's commitment to joint as well as
separate action.
Finally, unlike Jefferson's resolutions, but like those adopted
by the Kentucky legislature in 1798, copies of the Virginia Resolutions were transmitted to "each of the Senators and Representatives, representing this State in the Congress of the United
States. "32 Like a majority of the Kentucky legislators in 1798,
Madison sought formal change through established institutions
of federal government. His aspirations, like those of the Kentucky legislators, were realized in some form through the Republican party's rise to power and the demise of the Alien and
Sedition Acts.
In the shorter term, however, concurrence and reversal were
not forthcoming. On the contrary, a majority of co-states criticized the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures' claims of interpretive independence. Madison was asked to defend the Virginia
Resolutions against the other states' criticisms, which he did by
drafting a "Report on the Virginia Resolutions." Before study30. 17 Papers of James Madison at 189-90. Madison was referring, of course, to the
First Amendment. His draft emphasized that the Alien and Sedition Acts were "levelled
against that right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed, the only effectual
guardian of every other right." I d.
31. Id. at 190.
32. Id.
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ing that report, it is helpful to review the charges to which
Madison was responding and some of the dilemmas he faced.
II.

REJOINDERS
A
Ten of the existing sixteen states' legislatures formally or informally rejected the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of
1798.33 Seven states responded directly by returning formal resolutions. Five of these states' legislatures asserted that federal
courts held the prerogative that Jefferson had claimed the states
held: authority to invalidate federal legislation as unconstitutional.34 The legislatures' positions on this issue were remarkably
confident, considering that the controversy over the Alien and
Sedition Acts preceded Marbury v. Madison.3s Two other states'
legislatures affirmed principles of federal supremacy more generally by asserting that the Virginia Resolutions unjustifiably interfered with the "constituted authorities" of the United States.36
Three states rejected the resolutions without returning formal
protests,37 and four states were silent.3s
33. The formal responses are reprinted in 4 Debates at 532-39 (cited in note 8).
Other responses are described and reprinted in Frank M. Anderson, Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 5 Am. Hist. Rev. 45 (1890); 5 id. at 225.
34. The General Assembly of Rhode Island claimed that the United States Supreme
Court had ultimate authority to decide on "the constitutionality of any act or law of the
Congress of the United States." The Massachusetts legislature was less direct but clearly
implied that the Supreme Court had ultimate authority to decide on the constitutionality
of federal legislation. The New York legislature indicated that states were bound by decisions of federal courts and denied that state legislatures had authority "to supervise the
acts of the general government." The New Hampshire legislature claimed that the duty to
decide on the constitutionality of "laws of the general government ... is properly and
exclusively confided to the judicial department" of that government. Finally, the Vermont legislature asserted that power "to decide on the constitutionality of laws made by
the general government [was] exclusively vested in the judiciary courts of the Union." 4
Debates at 533-39.
35. Marbury was decided in 1803. But see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386 (1798),
in which the Supreme Court assumed authority to review the constitutionality of state
legislation. Compare generally James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893); Edward S. Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 Mich. L. Rev. 102, 102-25, 283-316 (1910).
36. The General Assembly of Delaware tersely characterized the resolutions of 1798
as "a very unjustifiable interference with the general government and constituted authorities of the United States, and of dangerous tendency." The General Assembly of Connecticut expressed its approval of the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts and
declared that they had been enacted by "the constituted authorities." 4 Debates at 532,
538.
37. The legislatures of Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania took actions that
opposed the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions but did not return formal responses. See
Anderson, 5 Am. Hist. Rev. at 46-52 and app. (cited in note 33).
38. The four silent states were from the South: North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Tennessee. See id. at 235-36 for a summary of the meager evidence of
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It is not surprising that a majority of the states sided with the
federal government. Representative structures made that result
likely. Although Congress had means of rising above or sinking
below majority sentiment, the national legislature was also
designed to be responsive to its constituents. Furthermore, executive and judicial officials were not isolated from pressures or
sentiments that presumably had led to passage of the Alien and
Sedition Acts. Each state had interests in backing the federal
government's enforcement of laws benefitting them, and federal
structures provided no formal means for dissenting states to go
against collective determinations. Instead, the concept of national supremacy weighed against particular states impeding the
enactment and enforcement of laws that were backed by at least
a majority of the states' legislatures (and presumably the people
at large).
Hence the feature that made the concept of national
supremacy most attractive, the principle of subordinating separate to collective prerogatives, also posed the greatest threat to
principles of limited government. There was a danger that those
entrusted with instruments of collective power would use them to
enforce compliance with decisions on matters that were reserved
by the Constitution for separate determination. These principles
applied to rights and powers reserved to the people separately,
not just to powers of the states. In each case, it was problematic
to rely on institutions that held collective power to define the
scope of their authority and limitations on its exercise.
It made sense, therefore, for the dissenting states not to
make their opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts contingent
on other states' concurrence. Accordingly, the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures asserted that the acts were unconstitutional
even if a majority of the states supported them. If the laws were
unconstitutional, and if a majority of the states did favor them,
there would have been a failure of constitutionalism, and dissenting states would have been in a perilous predicament.
The two dissenting states' legislatures argued, in essence,
that there had been a form of constitutional breakdown but tempered opposition to federal representational processes with recognition of the need to give such structures a chance to correct
themselves. The Kentucky and Virginia legislatures primarily
emphasized an established means of constitutional correction: reproceedings in such states with respect to the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Anderson reasonably speculated that some Southern legislators may have been uncertain what
remedies were appropriate even if such persons were sympathetic with the Kentucky and
Virginia legislatures' opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts.
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peal by Congress. But these two legislatures also asserted that
interim or alternative measures were necessary to protect the
people's rights within the states' borders.39 The Resolutions apparently sanctioned disregard of the Alien and Sedition Acts by
state citizens and public officials. Perhaps the legislators also
sought to reinforce opposition, in practice, to enforcement of the
laws by federal officials.
The Republican party's electoral victories in 1800 did not
negate the importance of the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures'
efforts to oppose the objectionable acts' enforcement even prior
to their expiration. These forms of resistance were comparable
to individuals' disobeying laws prior to their repeal or judicial
declarations of unconstitutionality. In many cases, disregard of
laws has been a predicate to judicial review, stimulated political
discourse, or otherwise influenced legislative reconsideration.40
Similar forms of resistance by institutions of state government
have also been warranted under appropriate circumstances. In
each case, later reversals have affirmed rather than mooted challenges on constitutional grounds.41
B

Jefferson's draft was solidly grounded to the extent it asserted the states' interpretive independence. But the draft was
39. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, like Jefferson's draft, placed less emphasis
on the possibility of correction by the federal judiciary, but neither set of resolutions ruled
out that possibility. As indicated in the text, judicial review is best viewed as an alternative means of constitutional correction. It has important advantages over ordinary legislative processes: its interim character (it does not depend on elections), and the fact that it
operates through ordinary constitutional forms (adjudication) rather than extraordinary
forms (such as constitutional amendment). The principal disadvantage of judicial review,
of course, is that it permits legislators to escape responsibility for repealing unconstitutional acts.
40. Compare Robert M. Cover's argument, in The Supreme Coun, 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev 4, 46-47 (1983), that those who disregard
laws as unconstitutional do not necessarily regard their actions as forms of "civil disobedience" but as means of being faithful to higher law standards of the Constitution itself. To
treat such actions as forms of "civil disobedience" privileges official interpretations that
may be erroneous.
41. Claims of constitutional prerogative to resist enforcement of laws do not necessarily depend, however, on any particular governmental officials' subsequently endorsing
such positions. An analogous example is the late Frederick Douglass' efforts to interpret
the Constitution during the antebellum period as inconsistent with slavery. (Douglass
initially endorsed William Garrison's position that the Constitution was pro-slavery.)
One may affirm Douglass' radical anti-slavery interpretive positions and regard them as
constitutionally authoritative, even though they never received official endorsement by
the Supreme Court or other federal institutions. It took a Civil War and formal amendments, not just reinterpretations of existing norms, before anti-slavery constitutionalism
received official prominence.
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on more tenuous ground insofar as it went further and claimed to
have greater formal significance than the resolutions actually approved by the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures in 1798. Jefferson's version of the Kentucky Resolutions claimed to do within
the state what several of the states assumed judicial review could
do within the nation: formally invalidate, or annul, acts of legislation on constitutional grounds prior to legislative repeal or
expiration.
Both methods would have utilized established constitutional
forms: state legislatures or federal courts. Both would have been
means of vindicating individual rights and other constitutional
prerogatives that were vulnerable to majoritarian infringement.
There was textual support for each position: the Tenth Amendment and Articles III and VI of the original text.42 But these two
means of nullification presupposed radically different conceptions of the proper methods for correcting constitutional mistakes at the federal level.
The Kentucky legislature eventually embraced Jefferson's
claim that the states had authority to nullify the Alien and Sedition Acts. After a majority of the states rejected Kentucky's and
Virginia's overtures, the Kentucky legislature adopted a second
set of resolutions in 1799 that included provisions on nullification
comparable to those in Jefferson's original draft but deleted from
the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. In 1799, the Kentucky legislature resolved:
That the several states who formed [the Constitution], being
sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to
judge of the infraction; and, That a nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done under color of that instrument, is the rightful remedy.43

These resolutions reflect a significantly stronger conception of
state authority than the Resolutions of 1798.
As with Jefferson's draft, it is not clear whether the Kentucky legislators were claiming in 1799 that they had authority to
nullify the Alien and Sedition Acts unilaterally or whether the
legislators presupposed only that the states collectively had such
authority. The Kentucky legislature expressed its unwillingness
to "surrender its opinion to a majority of its sister states" on this
"momentous" issue. In any event, the legislators apparently con42. The constitutional text does not, however, explicitly delegate the power of judicial review.
43. See 4 Debates at 545 (cited in note 8) (emphasis in original). Compare Jefferson's draft, reprinted in 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 301 (cited in note 8).
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eluded that they had exhausted all other appropriate interim
remedies and no longer looked to statutory repeal or constitutional amendment as likely means of redress. They vowed to
"oppose, in a constitutional manner, every attempt, at what quarter soever offered, to violate [the federal] compact."44
The state legislature's assertion of authority to disregard
decisions by federal officials was in tension with principles of
constitutional representation. The Constitution's authority purported to flow from the people of the United States as a collectivity and/or from the states acting collectively, not from the
states separately or their legislatures. The Constitution, in tum,
has entrusted a range of governing authority to institutions that
have purportedly represented the whole people and all the states.
Principles of legal supremacy have required the subordination of
separately held prerogatives to laws made by such institutions. It
would have been anomalous if state officials, acting on behalf of
a state, could legitimately preempt decisions made by federal officials on behalf of the entire United States. Similar principles
have applied to relationships between assertions of individual
rights or powers and exercises of federal or state governmental
powers.4s
The Constitution has not, however, given federal officials
authority to preempt all separate determinations. On the contrary, it has delegated limited federal powers and reserved some
rights and powers to be exercised separately by individuals,
groups, and the states as such. Along with arguing that the Alien
and Sedition Acts were invalid as ultra vires, the Virginia and
Kentucky legislatures exercised forms of speech, petitioning, and
other means of influencing federal actions. These two legislatures presumed that the Constitution reserved these prerogatives
to the respective states rather than precluded their separate
exercise.
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions did more than assert
the states' powers of political expression. The two legislatures
also claimed to be protecting similar prerogatives of the people
from abridgement by federal officials. According to the Resolutions, the Alien and Sedition Acts imposed impermissible restraints on citizens' rights of free speech, the press, and the like.
Other rights and powers were beneath the surface but no less
44. 4 Debates at 545.
45. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Chief Justice John
Marshall developed arguments for national supremacy within the federal government's
sphere of delegated authority. The Court reaffirmed these principles in United States v.
Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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significant: voting prerogatives of the people and state legislatures, along with their respective powers to initiate constitutional
change through formal amendments.
It is noteworthy that the Constitution did not expressly reserve to the states or their legislatures the authority to act on
behalf of the states' residents by the forms of speech, petitioning,
and influence that the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions exemplify. This omission did not imply, however, that the states had
no such authority. On the contrary, the Tenth Amendment's reference to the states' reserved powers, like the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments' references to unenumerated rights and powers of
the people, reinforced the legislatures' positions.
Because the Tenth Amendment is open ended, it no more
settled questions concerning the states' powers of protest than it
settled arguments over the constitutionality of the acts themselves. These two issues were, of course, distinct: the validity of
the Alien and Sedition Acts and the validity of the Kentucky and
Virginia legislatures' responses to the federal enactments. Furthermore, as indicated, issues of interpretive authority were
equally relevant at both levels. The controversy over the Alien
and Sedition Acts not only raised questions about who had authority to decide on the acts' validity; it also raised questions
about who had authority to decide on the scope of the states'
powers of protest.

c
In a lengthy "Report on the Virginia Resolutions," which
the Virginia General Assembly approved early in 1800, Madison
defended the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 against the other
states' criticisms.46 Among other things, the Report revisited the
issue of a collective nullifying authority. It also analyzed more
thoroughly the constitutional significance of state legislatures'
separate determinations.
In the course of defending the state legislature's approval of
the Virginia Resolutions, Madison relied on distinctions among
the states, their legislatures, and the people thereof. He observed that the term "states" had several meanings:
It is indeed true that the term "States," is sometimes used in a

vague sense, and sometimes in different senses, according to
46. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (January 7, 1800) is reprinted in 17
Papers of James Madison at 307-51 (cited in note 8). The Virginia legislature adopted the
Report substantially as drafted by Madison, and thus it is not necessary to distinguish his
draft from the final version.
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the subject to which it is applied. Thus it sometimes means the
separate sections of territory occupied by the political societies
within each; sometimes the particular governments, established by those societies; sometimes those societies as organized into those particular governments; and lastly, it means the
people composing those political societies, in their highest sovereign capacity.47

He claimed that "all will at least concur" that the "States," in the
last sense, were parties to the Constitution because it was submitted to the people of the states and they ratified it in their highest
sovereign capacity.4s
Madison extended this line of reasoning, with its emphasis
on the states' foundational political powers, by arguing explicitly
what he had only suggested before. He argued that the states, as
sovereign entities, had authority to overrule usurpations of
power by federal officials. Echoing Jefferson's position in his
draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, Madison asserted that the
Constitution, like other compacts, was governed by the "plain
principle, founded in common sense, illustrated by common practice, and essential to the nature of compacts; that where resort
can be had to no tribunal superior to the authority of the parties,
the parties themselves must be the rightful judges in the last resort, whether the bargain made, has been pursued or violated."
Because "the states [were] parties to the constitutional compact,
and in their sovereign capacity," Madison reasoned, "there can
be no tribunal above their authority, to decide in the last resort,
whether the compact made by them be violated." Thus he concluded that the states "must themselves decide in the last resort,
such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their
interposition. "49
Accordingly, Madison denied that the United States
Supreme Court was, as several of the state legislatures had
claimed, "the sole expositor of the constitution, in the last resort." Again echoing Jefferson's position, Madison explained
that "this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation
to the authorities of the other departments of the government;
not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional
compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments
hold their delegated trusts." Even the judiciary might "exercise
or sanction dangerous powers beyond the grant of the constitu47.
48.
49.

ld. at 308-09.
Id. at 309.
ld. at 309-10.
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tion." For this reason, "the ultimate right of the parties to the
constitution, to judge whether the compact has been dangerously
violated, must extend to violations by one delegated authority, as
well as by another; by the judiciary, as well as by the executive,
or the legislature. "so
Later in the Report, however, Madison equivocated on the
status of the Virginia legislature's declaration of unconstitutionality. In these later passages, he emphasized the states' powers to
act as intermediaries and their power of communication rather
than their power to judge authoritatively the validity of federal
actions. On the other hand, several passages indicate that he was
taking a position that the states collectively had some sort of nullifying power, even if they did not have that authority separately.
In analyzing the states' powers of "interposition," Madison
referred to expectations during the founding period that state
legislatures would act as intermediaries between the people and
the federal government. He alluded to criticisms of the proposed
Constitution and pointed out that in response to such criticisms,
"the appeal was emphatically made to the intermediate existence
of the state governments between the people and [the general]
government." More specifically, he observed that state governments had been expected to "descry the first symptoms of usurpation" and to "sound the alarm to the public." It is not clear
whether Madison was endorsing the potential role of state legislatures as protectors of the people's rights simply (though profoundly) because there had been an historical understanding on
this issue or because he thought it was a good argument, independent of historical expectations. In any event, he linked the
states' action to historical expectations.st
Other historical sources provided further support for
Madison's position. According to the Annals of Congress, when
he had introduced a proposed bill of rights, Madison had emphasized how the proposed amendments would reinforce the ability
of state legislatures to oppose unconstitutional actions by federal
officials. His underlying assumption had been that the states' re50. ld. at 311. Madison also explained that interposition by the states was warranted
in those "great and extraordinary cases, in which all the forms of the Constitution may
prove ineffectual against infractions dangerous to the essential rights of the parties to it."
Id. Compare his anticipation in The Federalist No. 51, of the need for checks on the
federal government by the states.
51. 17 Papers of James Madison at 349-50 (cited in note 8). Compare The Federalist
Nos. 26, 28 & 44. Alexander Hamilton in the 78th Federalist and John Marshall in decisions such as Marbury v. Madison relied on similar conceptions of representation to defend judicial review. Each grounded the authority of governmental officials on that of
"the people."
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served powers and the people's retained rights overlapped.
Based on that insight, he had claimed that state legislatures
would be vigilant in protesting usurpations of power and would
thereby serve as "sure guardians of the people's liberty." He had
gone so far as to urge that the states acting in that capacity would
"be able to resist with more effect every assumption of power,
than any other power on earth [could] do."s2
Madison's "Report on the Virginia Resolutions" thus complemented those Resolutions and earlier arguments that state
legislatures could legitimately act on behalf of the states' citizens
by opposing unconstitutional federal legislation at least some
ways and for some purposes. At a high level of generality, this
assertion was obviously correct. The important question, however, was more specifically whether the Virginia Resolutions
qualified as a legitimate exercise of such power. That question,
in turn, depended on what the Resolutions purported to do.
In some places, Madison attributed limited significance to
the Resolutions. His Report indicated that declarations of unconstitutionality by one or more states, whether expressed by
their legislatures or otherwise, were merely "expressions of opinion, unaccompanied with any other effect than what they may
produce on opinion, by exciting reflection." Such declarations
"may lead to a change in the legislative expression of the general
will; possibly to a change in the opinion of the judiciary."
Madison repeatedly denied that such a declaration would either
nullify the Alien and Sedition Acts or adjudicate their validity.
He emphasized his point by way of contrast in assuming that "expositions of the judiciary, on the other hand, are carried into immediate effect by force."s3
He compared communications among state governments to
communications among the people themselves:
[A) free communication among the states, where the constitution imposes no restraint, is as allowable among the state governments, as among other public bodies, or private citizens.
This consideration derives a weight, that cannot be denied to
it, from the relation of the state legislatures, to the federal legislature, as the immediate constituents of one of its branches. 54

Madison emphasized how state legislatures were distinctively
positioned to act in dual capacities as representatives and as constituents. He argued that state legislatures were responsible for
52.
53.
54.

1 Annals of Congress at 439 (June 8, 1789) (cited in note 19).
17 Papers of James Madison at 348 (cited in note 8).
Id.
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fostering communication among their constituents and also
needed to communicate among themselves both to ensure their
proper representation in the Senate and as predicates to other
collective actions.ss
Madison did not, therefore, view state legislative interposition merely as an exercise of the state's will. He also suggested
that such an action could appeal to others' judgment as it might
relate to further formal action. He had explained in the 44th
Federalist that state legislatures could seek congressional repeal
of unconstitutional legislation by replacing their Senators and exerting their "local influence" over elections to the House of Representatives.s6 He later extended this reasoning and suggested
that state officials might have petitioned Congress to propose an
explanatory amendment or applied for a constitutional convention to overrule the Alien and Sedition Acts.s1 These remarks
indicate that he thought the success of the Virginia Resolutions
would depend largely on their effects on constitutional choices by
members of Congress, the federal judiciary, and state legislators.
Madison was unclear, however, on whether he was assuming
that the Resolutions were significant only as predicates to other
actions or also because they had some sort of intrinsic normative
effect. He commented:
[I]f the other states had concurred in making a like declaration, supported too by the numerous applications flowing immediately from the people, it can scarcely be doubted, that
these simple means would have been as sufficient, as they are
unexceptionable.ss

He did not give his views on what the consequences of such concurrence would have been.
There are at least three ways of reading this passage. First,
he might have been claiming that applications (or "petitions")
from among "the people" at large would have annulled the Alien
and Sedition Acts even if the state legislatures' declarations of
55. Madison suggested that communication among states was necessary in connection with their (a) conveying views to their representatives in the Senate, {b) originating
constitutional amendments, (c) deciding whether to admit new states, and (d) entering
into contracts with one another. See id. The Seventeenth Amendment's adoption in 1913
did not preclude state officials from representing the people in the ways that Madison
defended. If anything, this change in constitutional structures increased the importance
of institutions acting as intermediaries between the people and the federal government.
56. See The Federalist No. 44.
57. 17 Papers of James Madison at 349 (cited in note 8). Compare his piece, Notes
On Nullification (1835·36), reprinted in 9 Writings of James Madison at 573-607 (cited in
note 8).
58. 17 Papers of James Madison at 349 (cited in note 8).
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unconstitutionality had not had that effect. Second, he might
have thought the concurrence of other state legislatures would
have effectively nullified the laws, at least if there was evidence
that a preponderance of the people supported the states against
the federal government. Third, he might have thought that public opinion would eventually prevail in dictating the choices made
by federal representatives even if petitions or resolutions from
state legislatures and/or the people at large had not themselves
had any intrinsic normative consequences. According to this last
reading, the appropriate measure of the resolutions' success
would be their effect on public opinion rather than whether they
had annulled the federal laws.s9
The first reading, that the people's separate petitions might
nullify the Acts, would have been inconsistent with other positions that Madison had articulated. He would not have considered separate actions by the people at large to be any more
effective than separate resolutions by state legislatures. As he
had explained to the First Congress, separate bodies of the people could not overturn actions by representatives of the whole
people.60
The second reading, that collective state action might nullify
the Acts, would have best complemented the text of the Virginia
Resolutions, Madison's comments to Jefferson, and earlier
passages in the "Report on the Virginia Resolutions." These
materials presupposed that concurrent actions by at least a majority of the states, acting together on behalf of the people of the
respective states and/or the people of the United States in their
combined sovereign capacity, would have had normative consequences transcending actions by the states separately and even
might have superseded actions by the federal government.
59. Compare Marshall's emphasis in McCulloch on federal structures as vehicles for
protecting state prerogatives and bringing about constitutional change. See also Justice
Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author·
ity, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
60. In debates over whether the First Congress should add to the First Amendment's precursor a provision guaranteeing a right of the people to instruct their repre~nt
atives, Madison argued that sovereignty in America was held by the whole Amencan
people rather than "detached bodies" of them. He reportedly observed that "the inhabitants of any district" do not "speak the voice of the people; so far from it, their ideas
may contradict the sense of the whole people." He indicated that "the people [could]
change the constitution if they please[d]," but he claimed that "while the constitution
exists, they must conform themselves to its dictates." His position, in other words, was
that part of "the people" could not legitimately "contravene an act established by the
whole people." He concluded, therefore, that it was "not true" that "the people have a
right to instruct their representatives in such a sense as that the delegates are obli~ed ~o
conform to those instructions." 1 Annals of Congress at 738-39 (Aug. 15, 1789) (ctted m
note 19).
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Madison did not, however, fully explore that possibility in his Report because the issue had become moot by then. Between 1798
and 1800, a majority of the states had declined to concur in the
Kentucky and Virginia declarations of unconstitutionality.6t
Nevertheless, it is significant that Madison apparently would
have attributed greater authority to joint actions by united states
than to actions by the federal government, at least under some
circumstances, even if the states had acted outside forms established by the Constitution. Such a concurrent action, claiming to
be grounded in the sovereign authority of the American people
(whether of the states combined or of the United States as such),
would have represented an exercise of power comparable to judicial review but surpassing it in scale. Like judicial review, this
determination would not have purported to change constitutional standards. Instead, it allegedly would have reaffirmed existing constitutional norms. The vehicle for making that
affirmation, however, would have been state legislatures rather
than federal courts. Given the states' roles in adopting and
amending the Constitution and their direct and indirect representation in the federal government, the constitutional and political
dimensions of such a determination could not have been easily
dismissed.
It was unlikely such a combined action would take place unless there was a wide gulf between governmental actions and predominant dispositions among the people at large. At the time of
the Constitution's framing, however, many persons appear to
have been concerned about precisely that type of possibility.
Furthermore, it is conceivable that much of the public at large
might have supported combined efforts of several states against
the federal government during the Republic's early years if the
latter government had egregiously violated foundational principles of American constitutionalism (as the dissenting states understood them). Jefferson and Madison treated the Alien and
61. Compare Madison's later comment on the Virginia Resolutions in his piece,
Notes On Nullification, reprinted in 9 Writings of James Madison at 592 (cited in note 8):
It is sometimes asked in what mode the States could interpose in their collective character as parties to the Constitution against usurped power. It was
not necessary for the object & reasoning of the resolutions & report, that the
mode should be pointed out. It was sufficient to show that the authority to interpose existed, and was a resort beyond that of the Supreme Court of the U.S. or
any authority derived from the Constitution. The authority being plenary, the
mode was of its own choice, and it is obvious, that, if employed by the States as
co-parties to and creators of the Constitution it might either so explain the Constitution or so amend it as to provide a more satisfactory mode within the Constitution itself for guarding it against constructive or other violations.
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Sedition Acts as if they might precipitate a constitutional crisis of
this seriousness and magnitude.
The third reading of Madison's remarks, looking to the Resolutions' effects on public opinion, would have complemented
the idea of a collective nullifying authority and would have been
more practically relevant under the circumstances. Madison recognized that elected officials were ordinarily responsive to constituent demands. Furthermore, public sentiment within much of
the nation presumably supported rather than opposed the Alien
and Sedition Acts.6z Madison's awareness of the power of public
opinion in a republic such as the United States alerted him to the
dangerous tendencies of national sentiment. When commenting
on the likely efficacy of a bill of rights, Madison had suggested to
Jefferson that majority tyranny was more of a threat to individual
rights than was the possibility that representatives might go
against their constituents' wishes.63
In addition to setting a dangerous precedent for the improper working of governmental institutions, the Alien and Sedition Acts tested popular commitment to principles of
representative government. The crisis might have been a turning
point on whether the public at large would sanction or oppose
exercises of federal power beyond constitutional boundaries.
The people's acquiescence in such a transgression would have
provided a foundation for future encroachments on rights.64
That prospect would have deeply troubled Madison.
Much of what we know of Madison's thinking relates to his
hope that constitutional structures would elevate government
above transient sentiments and allow representatives to make
and enforce laws in accordance with the first principles set forth
in the Constitution itself. Congress' passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts and the federal judiciary's enforcement of the laws
went against these aspirations. Rather than rising above public
sentiments, the federal government had led the people away
from foundational principles. This crisis thus highlighted the
62. See Anderson, 5 Am. Hist. Rev. (cited in note 33).
63. See Madison's Letter to Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, reprinted in 11 Papers of James
Madison at 295, 298 (cited in note 8) ("In our Governments the real power lies in the
majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from
acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents.") (emphasis in original).
64. Compare Jefferson's Letter to Stephens Thompson Mason, Oct. 11, 1798, reprinted in 7 Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 282-83 (cited in note 8) (Jefferson warned
that public acquiescence in the Alien and Sedition Acts would set a dangerous
precedent).
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need for additional precautions against abuses of power. The
Bill of Rights had been one such "ancillary precaution," but that
"legal check" had failed even in the hands of the federal judiciary.6s Thus Madison turned to another major check on federal
power: state governments.
In addition to having regulatory powers of their own, these
governments were uniquely situated to influence public opinion.
State officials could also serve one of the same crucial functions
that federal structures had been designed to achieve: to recall
public opinion to fundamental principles and to encourage the
people and their representatives to rise above passing factionalism. Madison was probably aware that his efforts to enlist state
legislatures as vehicles for shaping public opinion went against
the people's momentary inclinations and those of their federal
representatives. But he expressed a conviction that the viability
of constitutional government would depend on the success of efforts by him and others of like mind.
III.

PROBLEMS OF CONTINUING VIABILITY

Constitutional developments since the late eighteenth century have brought to the surface at least three sets of issues involving claims of state interpretive autonomy. First, is the idea of
dispersed interpretive authority consistent with commitment to
the rule of law? Second, is that idea consistent with the Constitution's premise that its authority flows from "the people of the
United States"? Third, have constitutional changes made obsolete the idea of state officials exercising powers inconsistent with
federal positions?66
65. Compare Thomas Jefferson's Letter to James Madison, March 15, 1789, in which
Jefferson suggested that a bill of rights would give judges a "legal check" to enforce
against the people's elected representatives. The Jetter is reprinted in Julian P. Boyd, ed.,
14 Papers of Thomas Jefferson at 659-62 (Princeton U. Press, 1958). Madison reportedly
repeated that argument on June 8, 1789, when he presented proposed amendments to the
House of Representatives: He presumed that judges would "consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights" and would be "naturally led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration
of rights." See 1 Annals of Congress at 439 (cited in note 19). See also Wayne D. Moore,
Written and Unwritten Constitutional Law in the Founding Period: The Early New Jersey
Cases, 7 Const. Comm. 341 (1990).
66. Like Jefferson's and Madison's reliance on institutions of state government to
oppose exercises of federal power in 1798, other efforts to assert state autonomy have
been tarnished by the association of such arguments with efforts by southern states to
preserve slavery and oppose racial integration. Thus some persons may be inclined to
regard the South's military defeat in the Civil War, along with the formal defeat of governmentally sponsored racial inequality through the Reconstruction Amendments and
their enforcement by federal officials, as constitutionally authoritative repudiations of
claims that state officials have the sort of interpretive independence considered above.
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A full examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this
essay.67 But some treatment of them is necessary to evaluate the
contemporary relevance of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions and Madison's defense of the latter. Even if it is not possible to resolve finally problems that are wonderfully open-ended,
there are good reasons for suggesting directions for further
analysis.
A
There is no need for detailed analysis here of whether the
rule of law is undercut by state officials' expressing, or communicating, positions on constitutional issues. Nor is it within the
scope of this essay to examine more closely whether the states,
through legislatures or otherwise, may separately invalidate federallaws.6s But if one reaches a conclusion that representatives
of a state may independently interpret the Constitution for some
purposes but not others, there is a need to confront questions
about how far principles of state interpretive autonomy extend.
There are at least three ways to deal with controversies involving efforts by state officials and/or the people of a state to act
inconsistently with federal positions other than through the
forms of speech and petitioning defended by Madison. First, one
may assume that as a matter of constitutional logic, the Constitution necessarily means what one or more authoritative institutions of the federal government declare it to mean. Jefferson,
Madison, and the other authors of the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions rejected such a skeptical conception of constitutional
meaning. They presumed that the Constitution's meaning was
See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 Rev. Pol. 401, 420 n.28 (1986) (suggested that the Civil War "effectively invalidated" claims of "confederated departmentalism," or "nullification,"
including the forms advocated by Jefferson in the Kentucky Resolutions and by Calhoun
and others during the antebellum period).
67. It is also beyond the scope of this essay to examine the practical implications of
affirming state interpretive autonomy. My main concern is constitutional norms, which
are distinguishable from actual political practices. But these two issues are not completely severable, because constitutional norms are created through political practices,
and an important criterion for evaluating the Constitution's normative structures is how
they have operated (or are operating) in practice.
68. Interestingly, section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 apparently contemplated
state judges deciding on the validity of federal treaties, statutes and other exercises of
federal power. The Judiciary Act, like its contemporary equivalent, also presumed that
Article III gave the Supreme Court authority to review these decisions, among others.
Not surprisingly, states have opposed the Supreme Court's exercise of this appellate
power. See generally Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme
Court of the United States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47
Am. L. Rev. 1 (1913); 47 id. at 161.
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independent not only of their positions but also of interpretations by one or more federal officials. Many persons today
would likewise deny that the Constitution's meaning is properly
reducible to interpretations of it by any particular institution or
set of institutions, including the Supreme Court and/or other federal officials.69
A second possibility is that the Constitution does not presuppose skepticism regarding its own meaning, but does give
legal finality for some purposes to certain types of governmental
decisions, such as decisions by courts of last resort, even when
those decisions do not measure up to standards of the Constitution
itself Writing in the mid-1830's, Madison took such a position in
the context of criticizing the South Carolina legislature's claim of
a unilateral nullifying authority. In an apparent retreat from his
position in the Virginia Resolutions and his defense of them,
Madison argued that it would be incoherent for a state to claim a
constitutional right to disobey "the constitutional authority":
It remains, however, for the nullifying expositors to specify the right & mode of interposition which the Resolution
meant to assign to the States individually . ...
They cannot say that the right meant was a Constl. right
to resist the Constitutional authy; for that is a contradiction in
terms, as much as a legal right to resist a law.70

Variations of this argument remain viable. The Supreme Court
has treated its own decisions as parts of the "supreme law" that
others are bound to obey;71 and commentators have defended
that approach as an essential component of the rule of law.72
69. Arguments for judicial review, as articulated by Alexander Hamilton in the 78th
Federalist and as asserted by John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, have traditionally
rested on an assumption that the Constitution's meaning transcends judicial interpretations. For more recent analyses of this issue from a variety of perspectives, see Sotirios A.
Barber, On What the Constitution Means (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1984); William F. Harris, II, The Interpretable Constitution (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1993); Edwin Meese, III,
The Law of the Constitution, 61 Thl. L. Rev. 979 (1987).
70. Madison, Notes On Nullification, included among The Papers of James Madison,
vol. 89 (Library of Congress, Manuscript Collection) (emphasis in original). Hunt's version incorrectly shows "construction," not "contradiction."
71. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974). The former case dealt with relationships between the Supreme Court's interpretations and state officials' constitutional obligations; the latter dealt with whether the President was bound by the Supreme Court's opposing interpretation of the scope of the
executive privilege.
72. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61
Thl. L. Rev. 991 (1987); Rex E. Lee, The Provinces of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 Tul.
L. Rev. 1009 (1987); and Ramsey Clark, Enduring Constitutional Issues, 61 Thl. L. Rev.
1093 (1987). For a more general defense of treating decisions by particular governmental
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But Madison's reference to "the constitutional authority"
raises serious questions about what institution, if any, has final
interpretive authority for purposes of resolving contests among
institutions of the federal government-whether or not the decisions of that "constitutional authority" are final for other purposes. Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt,
Frederick Douglass and others have joined Jefferson and the
early Madison in denying that the Supreme Court's interpretive
precedents preclude presidents and members of Congress from
independently interpreting the scope of their delegated powers
and limitations on their exercise.73 These persons treated conflicts among institutions of the federal government as integral
components of a constitutional design that has depended on mutually checking exercises of overlapping powers-including interpretive powers.
One might regard interpretive disputes, unlike other conflicting exercises of power, as inconsistent with constitutional ideals. Admittedly, interpretive disputes may represent a form of
legal failure, since one or more officials may be acting based on
distorted conceptions of constitutional meaning. Doubtless it
would be better for federal officials to take fully consistent positions-with each other and with constitutional imperatives.
Both dimensions of consistency are important. The Constitution treats complementary positions as commendable only to
the extent they are also consistent with requirements of law. In
addition, the constitutional design reflects an assumption that its
own norms are more likely to be vindicated through processes
that allow for mutually checking exercises of power than through
the consolidation of all powers in a single governmental institution. Allowing conflicting exercises of power, including interpretive powers, is thus one means of checking positions that do not
measure up to these ideals.74
institutions as legally preclusive (at least for some purposes), see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1%1).
73. See notes 77-79, infra, and the accompanying text. See also Walter F. Murphy,
48 Rev. Pol. (cited in note 66); Levinson, Constitutional Faith (cited in note 24); Stephen
Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism
esp. ch. 4 (Oxford U. Press, 1990); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation
as Political Process (Princeton U. Press, 1988); Mark Thshnet, The Supreme Court, the
Supreme Law of the Land and Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 Thl. L. Rev. 1017
(1987); Robert F. Nagel, A Comment on Democratic Constitutionalism, 61 Tul. L. Rev.
1027 (1987); and Sanford Levinson Could Meese be Right this Tzme?, 61 Thl. L. Rev. 1071
(1987).
74. See, e.g., James Madison's arguments in the lOth and 51st Federalist that mutually checking governmental powers would be most likely to result in the making and enforcement of laws to promote the common good without abridging individual rights.
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Accordingly, interpretive disputes are signs of constitutional
vitality, not just failure, at least when federal officials rely on the
Constitution to limit the effects of others' distorted interpretations. Commitment to the rule of law, understood as compliance
with the Constitution's own imperatives, undercuts rather than
supports federal officials deferring to others' mistaken interpretations of the Constitution itself. In practice, therefore, the rule
of law is promoted by the Constitution's being flexible enough to
allow different persons, at least at the federal level, to act based
on diverging interpretive positions. In short, constitutional government may well presuppose rather than preempt interpretive
disagreement among federal officials.7s
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions support an analogous conception of relationships between federal and state interpretive powers. These documents, in various forms, reflect an
assumption that the states have authority to interpret and exercise their powers even in opposition to authoritative decisions by
one or more federal officials. This position offers an alternative
to those identified above: skepticism about the independence of
constitutional meanings from particular interpretations, or assuming that federal decisions preempt opposing actions even
when the decisions are inconsistent with constitutional norms.
Notwithstanding Madison's later claim, it is not inconsistent
to argue that states have a constitutional power to disregard unconstitutional federal actions. But there is an important qualification: constitutional logic supports a conclusion that state
officials only have authority to exercise their powers, not others'.
Interpretive conflict may not legitimately arise through state officials' purporting to exercise federal powers.76 There are good
reasons for concluding, though, that states may interpret and exercise their powers independently-with reference to the Constitution itself and not in subordination to applicable federal
precedents-even if the result is a conflict, in practice, between
state and federal actions.
This approach treats interpretive and other powers as symmetrical. As John Marshall argued in Marbury v. Madison, fed75. There are doubtless limits, in practice, to the Constitution's ability to accommodate interpretive disagreement-limits that were crossed around the time of the Civil
War. It is beyond the scope of this essay to examine these limits. The important point for
present purposes is that the Constitution can accommodate some interpretive
disagreement.
76. As suggested above, however, there may be special circumstances under which
state judges or other officials may have authority to invalidate federal actions that are
alleged to be unconstitutional (based on the standards of the federal Constitution)
through the exercise of state powers, at least pending federal review of those actions.
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eral judges may interpret the Constitution independently for
purposes of deciding cases over which they have jurisdiction.77
Likewise, presidents have the power claimed by Andrew Jackson: authority to decide for themselves on the validity of acts of
Congress, at least for purposes of deciding whether to veto them,
even if the result is an exercise of presidential power that conflicts with legislative and judicial interpretive precedents.7s Similar principles support Abraham Lincoln's argument that
Congress and the people at large have interpretive powers corresponding to their respective constitutional prerogatives: the Constitution gives Congress authority to interpret its legislative
powers, and the people at large may interpret the Constitution
independently of governmental officials in deciding how to exercise their rights and powers to political expression, voting, and
the like.79 Although the Constitution obligates the states and
their representatives to respect the authority of other persons to
exercise their powers, the states (typically through representatives) also may decide for themselves how to exercise their own.
Such an approach would not automatically settle all disputes
over constitutional issues or preclude interpretive mistakes. On
the contrary, a position that the states (and their representatives)
may legitimately exercise their reserved powers in opposition to
unconstitutional federal actions, if accepted and acted upon by
those who regard federal laws as invalid, might exacerbate inter77. Marshall's primary objective in Marbury was to deny claims of legislative interpretive supremacy, a position inconsistent with judges reviewing the validity of legislative
acts. It is less clear that Marshall sought to assert judicial interpretive supremacy. Ironically, his premise that other officials might, in practice, act inconsistently with constitutional norms also applies to judges. Thus his claim that judges had authority to interpret
the Constitution (particularly its delegation of judicial powers) independently of Congress
supports, by analogy, arguments by other officials that they have a constitutional obligation to order their actions with reference to the Constitution even if doing so entails
disregarding judicial positions.
78. See Andrew Jackson, Veto of the Bank Bill, July 10, 1832, reprinted in James D.
Richardson, ed., 2 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 581-82
(Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1908).
79. In his speech at Springfield, Illinois, on July 17, 1858, Lincoln argued: "[Stephen
Douglas] would have the citizen conform his vote to [the Supreme Court's decision in
Dred Scott]; the Member of Congress, his; the President, his use of the veto power. He
would make it a rule of political action for the people and all the departments of government. I would not. By resisting it as a political rule, I disturb no right of property, create
no disorder, excite no mobs." The speech is reprinted in Roy P. Basler, ed., 2 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 504-20 (Rutgers U. Press, 1953); the quote appears at
516. Frederick Douglass had likewise argued in a speech on July 5, 1852, that "every
American citizen has a right to form an opinion on the constitution, and to propagate that
opinion, and to use all honorable means to make his opinion the prevailing one."
Douglass' speech is reprinted by John W. Blassingame, ed., 2 The Frederick Douglass
Papers 359-88 (Yale U. Press, 1982); the quote appears at 385.
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pretive disputes. Some persons might use force, not just reasoning, to back up their positions.so
These considerations do not indicate that a diffused or multifaceted conception of interpretive authority is flawed. Paying attention to the states' interpretive prerogatives (along with
others') and affirming commitment to them in practice would
promote a healthy awareness of the possibilities and consequences of interpretive mistakes. Much constitutional meaning is
open ended, and arrangements among federal and state powers
(along with relationships among governmental powers and rights
and powers of the people at large) are extremely complex. As a
result, a large measure of tentativeness in the exercise of political
power is appropriate, particularly for those acting in opposition
to others' normative claims.
At the same time, principles of constitutional fidelity call for
conviction to the imperatives of supreme law.st Sometimes those
imperatives require persons to oppose others' actions. Being
willing to vindicate constitutional norms by acting consistently
80. One of the goals of the Federalists was to create a central government with
enough coercive power to be able to overcome opposition from among the states, not just
to be able to enforce laws against individuals. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Paradox of
Bill of Rights Rhetoric, 1787-1791, in Josephine F. Pacheco, ed., To Secure the Blessings of
Liberty: Rights in American History 83,85 (George Mason U. Press, 1993). On this score,
the Federalists' vision has largely been achieved. Federal military, fiscal, regulatory, and
enforcement powers are capable of imposing serious restraints on state actions. It would
be wrong to assume uncritically that all exercises of such powers have been consistent
with constitutional ideals, but it would equally wrong to deny that federal coercive powers
have often been used to uphold the Constitution. Compare, for example, the United
States military's treatment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II with
President Eisenhower's use of national troops to enforce desegregation in the aftermath
of Brown v. Board of Education.
It is less clear that the states have had adequate means, in practice, of protecting their
separately reserved powers. According to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), representative processes are adequate to protect state
powers from federal abridgement. See also Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). Some members of the Supreme Court have been
unwilling, however, to assume that ordinary representative processes are adequate to protect state prerogatives. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), for
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist compared the states' reserved powers to rights of the
people that judges were authorized to enforce as limitations on federal powers. New York
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), represents a renewed effort by judges to safeguard
principles of federalism. Without denying the importance of these precedents, the thrust
of this article is that persons should not equate constitutional limitations with those enforced by judges.
81. The Civil War is a reminder of the extremes to which individuals and public
officials may go when seeking to preserve or establish their normative visions. Constitutional disputes are typically resolved in a more orderly manner, though not necessarily
without the use of force. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional
Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 815 (1986), for analysis
of coercive dimensions of legal decision making.
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with them, even in the face of opposition, is a sign of constitutional commitment that deserves commendation, not
repudiation.s2
Extending principles of interpretive autonomy to embrace
the states' independently interpreting and exercising their reserved powers depends, of course, on an assumption that the
Constitution reserves some powers to the states, acting separately. In addition, there are questions about who may legitimately claim to act on behalf of a state by exercising powers
purportedly reserved to it. These issues also deserve further
consideration.
B

The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions based arguments for
state autonomy, including diffused interpretive powers, on a
premise that the Constitution was a "compact" among sovereign
states. That premise was controversial even in its time. But the
basic principles underlying these arguments remain viable: federal officials depend on affirmative delegations of power, and
those delegations are limited in scope.
H. Jefferson Powell recently criticized the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions for ignoring arguments during the founding period that the Constitution would not constitute a "compact." As
Powell explained, James Wilson and others had argued that "this
system is not a compact or contract; the system itself tells you
what it is; it is an ordinance and establishment of the people."s3
According to Powell, "[t]he [Kentucky and Virginia] Resolutions
simply ignored the recent and well-known debates over the Constitution's character, as well as the absence within its text of references to a compact or to the states as sovereign contracting
parties."84 Powell also contrasted Jeffersonian positions on the
Constitution's character with arguments by John Marshall and
82. The Constitution imposes constraints on how governmental officials may seek to
vindicate constitutional norms; and there are corresponding legal limitations on the
means available to individuals. For example, governmental officials are obliged to respect
principles of due process, and individuals are likewise obliged to respect laws against
harming persons, property, and the like. Adding further complication, various actions
have differing effects in supporting or undercutting respect for legal institutions and the
Constitution itself.
83. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 885, 930 & n.237 (1985) (citing James Wilson's remarks at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention on December 11, 1787). These remarks are reprinted by Merrill Jensen,
ed., 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 556 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976).
84. Powell, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 930 (cited in note 83).
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others who subsequently emphasized principles of national
supremacy.s5
It is important not to overstate the differences between Jefferson's and Madison's reliance on the idea of a constitutional
"compact" and Wilson's repudiation of contractual analogies
during the founding period. Wilson argued that the proposed
Constitution would form neither a compact among state governments nor a contract between the people and governmental institutions. Instead, he relied on the preamble and emphasized the
constitutional design's dependence on the people's foundational
political authority, including the people's authority to recall at
any time powers previously delegated by them to state governmental institutions. He likewise argued that the people would
continue to hold all sovereign powers after the proposed Constitution's ratification: "Those who ordain and establish have the
power, if they think proper, to repeal and annul."s6
Wilson linked these arguments to claims that the Constitution would delegate limited powers. He took a position that the
proposed Constitution, .unlike state constitutions, was structured
to limit federal officials to exercising enumerated powers. For
this reason, he argued that there was no need to enumerate rights
in the proposed constitutional text.87
He relied on this premise to deny that the federal Constitution would annihilate state governments. He claimed that the
people, by approving the Constitution, would transfer some but
not all governmental powers from state to federal institutions:
When the principle is once settled, that the people are the
source of authority, the consequence is, that they may take
from the subordinate governments powers with which they
have hitherto trusted them, and place those powers in the general government, if it is thought that there they will be productive of more good. They can distribute one portion of power
to the more contracted circle called state governments; they

85. ld. at 930, 942-48 (cited in note 83). Powell's article focused on historical conceptions of the Constitution's "intent," not interpretive prerogatives.
86. See the account of Wilson's remarks at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention,
as reprinted by Jensen, ed., 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution at 356-63 (Nov. 24, 1787, as reported by Thomas Lloyd) (cited in note 83); id. at 38284 (Nov. 28, 1787); id. at 554-58 (Dec. 11, 1787). See also id. at 383 ("[H]ere, sir, the fee
simple remains in the people at large, and, by this Constitution, they do not part with it.");
id. at 362 ("[T]he people may change the constitutions whenever and however they
please.").
87. See id. at 387-89 (Nov. 28, 1787).
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can also furnish another proportion to the government of the
United States.ss
He assumed, moreover, that even after the federal Constitution's
ratification, state officials would hold all governmental powers
not delegated to the federal government. In this connection, significantly, he referred to the party giving up powers to the federal government (in his terms, a "confederate republic," or the
"national government") as "the states":
When a confederate republic is instituted, the communities, of
which it is composed, surrender to it a part of their political
independence, which they before enjoyed as states . ... The
states should resign, to the national government, that part, and
that part only, of their political liberty, which placed in that
government will produce more good to the whole than if it had
remained in the several states.B9

Finally, he presumed that "[s]ince states as well as citizens are
represented in the Constitution before us, and form the objects
on which that Constitution is proposed to operate, it was necessary to notice and define federal as well as civil liberty."90 As
would Madison, he referred to "the states" as political communities, not just as the governmental institutions representing those
communities.
For good reasons, Wilson avoided the rhetoric of "compacts." But his analysis could have been coherently recast as
flowing from assumptions that "the people" formed "compacts"
among themselves, both as members of states and as members of
the United States, and in those capacities delegated governmental powers to institutions at both levels.9t Whether individuals
88. Id. at 449 (Dec. 1, 1787). See also id. at 496 (Dec. 4, 1787) (characterized federal
and state powers as divided by an imprecise "line").
89. Id. at 359 (Nov. 24, 1787) (emphasis added).
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
91. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793), Chief Justice John Jay
characterized the Constitution as a "compact" among "the people":
Every State constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a
State to govern themselves in a certain manner; and the Constitution of the
United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States to
govern themselves as to general objects, in a certain matter.
Significantly, Jay was a leading Federalist from New York. In a letter to N.P. Trist dated
February 15, 1830, Madison explained:
Although the old idea of a compact between the Government & the people
be justly exploded, the idea of a compact among those who are parties to a
Government is a fundamental principle of free Government.
The original compact is the one implied or presumed, but nowhere reduced
to writing, by which a people agree to form one society. The next is a compact,
here for the first time reduced to writing, by which the people in their social
state agree to a Government over them. These two compacts may be considered

1994]

VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS

351

and states were bound by a particular federal action thus hinged,
in his view, on whether power to perform that action had been
"surrendered" (even if only tentatively) by them through the
Constitution's adoption.
Thus there was substantial overlap among Wilson's arguments and those presented in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Each depended on an assumption that the Constitution
delegated limited powers to institutions of federal government.
Each claimed that the Constitution also reserved powers to the
respective states and contemplated their exercising these powers
separately. Each assumed that the states would be bound by federal actions within the scope of delegated powers but not outside
them.
Wilson placed greater emphasis on the authority of "the
people," joined as members of a national political community
and not just as members of states. Thus he identified important
problems with arguments that the Constitution was fundamentally a compact among states. He emphasized how the people at
large, not just the states as such, were constituents.
Even so, many of Wilson's arguments were consistent with
affirming some forms of state interpretive autonomy. He argued
that "the people" had divided governmental powers among federal and state institutions. There was no need to assume that the
people, acting through the Constitution, had withheld all interpretive powers from the latter institutions. On the contrary, his
claim that the Constitution divided governmental powers provided foundations for arguments that it also gave the respective
institutions adequate means for exercising those powers. Rather
than leading to a conclusion that state officials should have
treated federal officials as ultimate interpreters, the concept of
popular sovereignty could accommodate arguments that state officials should have subordinated their exercises of power to the
superior will of the people, as expressed in the Constitution itself.

c
There remain serious questions about how "the people"
have been politically constituted and how they may authoritatively act. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions presumed that
"the people" were constituted at least in part as members of
states. The Resolutions also assumed that "the people" of a state
as blended in the Constitution of the U.S., which recognises a union or society of
States, and makes it the basis of the Government formed by the parties to it.
9 Writings of James Madison at 355n. (cited in note 8).
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could act, at least in some contexts and for some purposes,
through state legislatures. Article VII supports a similar position
by contemplating actions by the people of the respective states
through conventions, and Article I gave state legislatures authority to act on behalf of the states for purposes of choosing senators. Article V also attaches significance to actions by the people
of the states, acting through conventions or state legislatures, as a
predicate to amending the constitutional text.
The preamble supports arguments, however, that "the people" are constituted not only as members of states. It purports to
rest the Constitution's authority on "the People of the United
States." When read with Article VII, moreover, the preamble
implies that concurrent actions by conventions among the states
would constitute an authoritative action of this more-inclusive
"people." Article V also makes national action, by Congress or a
national convention, a predicate to amending the constitutional
text. In addition, Articles I, II and III authorize federal officials
to act on behalf of "the People of the United States" within prescribed limits.
It appears, therefore, that the Constitution presupposes that
"the people" have at least two identities: as members of states
and as members of the United States.92 The preamble and Articles V and VII indicate that some forms of formal constitutional
change depend on concurrent actions by "the people," acting in
both capacities (national and state, through legislatures and/or
conventions). Pending such change, the Constitution subordinates ordinary governmental actions, by federal and state officials, to its own imperatives.
These assumptions have not become obsolete. The Constitution has withdrawn some powers from the states, placed additional limitations on powers not withdrawn, and delegated new
powers to Congress and other federal institutions. But the ideas
of limited federal powers and separately reserved state powers
remain viable.
The Fourteenth Amendment's definition of citizenship also
supports rather than undercuts arguments that "the people" remain constituted both as members of states and as members of
92. For purposes of this essay, it is not necessary to identify or examine other forms
of popular identity, including the Constitution's assumption that "the people" were constituted in part as separate individuals and as members of groups other than "the states"
and "the United States." One of the main issues raised by the Alien and Sedition Acts, of
course, was whether the First Amendment protected areas of individual autonomy for the
benefit of "the people" as individuals and members of political parties and other non·
governmental associations, not just as members of states.
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the United States. Section 1 defines "persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof"
as "citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside." This Amendment changed the composition of "the people" by expanding formal citizenship, but it did not eliminate
dual citizenship: national and state. As with other parts of the
Constitution, these provisions contemplate the people's continuing to act not only as members of a national polity and through
institutions of federal government, but also as members of states
and through institutions of state government.
It is difficult to deny that there have been legitimate shifts in
power from the states to the federal government. As a result, the
narrow conceptions of federal authority presented in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions have become, in a sense, outdated. Expanding federal powers have had wide-reaching
normative implications-with effects, among other things, on the
attributes (as well as scope) of national and state citizenship.
Arguments for state interpretive autonomy remain severable, however, from conclusions regarding the scope of federal
and state governmental powers and their respective relationships
to rights and powers of "the people," variously conceived. As
long as the Constitution preserves the states as autonomous
political units that have distinguishable reserved powers, the idea
of corresponding interpretive prerogatives remains coherent.
The constitutional design continues to allow state officials and
the people of the respective states to play important roles not
only in ratifying formal amendments but also in exercising other
rights and powers in ways that shape political discourse.93
It would be anomalous, indeed, to claim that state action is a
prerequisite to formally amending the constitutional text but
does not count for purposes of ascertaining the meaning of that
text. 94 It is more coherent to attribute to the states important
93. It is important to pay attention to how a variety of state officials, not just legislators, may act on behalf of the people of a state. This issue is especially important since
there is increasing diversity among the people of the respective states (which is also a
more inclusive category, as a matter of federal constitutional law, than during the founding period).
94. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L.J.
453 (1989), and Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (Belknap Press, 1991), for arguments that the Constitution allows for authoritative change through informal means that
go beyond those authorized by Article V. His arguments overlap, to some extent, my
presuppositions regarding the possibility of authoritative interpretive change. But Acker·
man seems more willing than I to regard state participation in interpretive change as
capable of being displaced by forms of national action. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Phi/a·
delphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043
(1988). Amar considers whether "the people" may legitimately amend the Constitution
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roles not only in changing the constitutional text, but also in sustaining and otherwise recreating fundamental law through interpretive dialogue.
CONCLUSION
A move beyond excessive preoccupation with the Constitution's judicial interpretation and enforcement is necessary to
place in perspective various efforts to deal with current political
dilemmas. It would be wrong, for example, to look to one person
or institution to resolve finally controversies over the constitutional validity of health care reform, educational initiatives, environmental policies, changes in criminal and civil laws, or efforts
to protect or limit reproductive choices. Instead, there are good
reasons for interpreting the Constitution as contemplating farreaching dialogue on the important issues of the day. There are
also good reasons for affirming, rather than undercutting, commitment to constitutional ideals even in the face of their popular
denial or official disregard.
Accordingly, constitutional theory and practice should be
expanded to embrace the core principles of state interpretive autonomy that are common to the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Although the states acting separately may pose serious
threats to principles of American constitutionalism, cutting off
the states' contributions to interpretive dialogue would threaten
more directly the Constitution itself. Commitment by state officials to constitutional norms, like affirmation of the Constitution's meaning and authority by members of the people at large,
deserves commendation rather than repudiation. There are reasons for concern, not celebration, should state officials and the
people of the states lose the capacity to interpret and exercise
their powers independently of federal officials.9s

through popular referenda or other means in addition to those contemplated by Article
V. For analysis of several models of representation and their consistency with deliberative ideals, see James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (Yale U. Press, 1991).
95. Even if one is only (or primarily) concerned about the ability of the people to
sustain principles of American constitutionalism, there are reasons for paying attention to
the roles of states in fostering popular political participation. See generally Symposium:
The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L.J. 1493-1723 (1988); Symposium: Roads Not
Taken: Undercurrents of Republican Thinking in Modem Constitutional Theory, 84 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1-249 (1989); Sheldon S. Wolin, The People's Two Bodies, 1 democracy 9
(1981).

